Bava Kamma 69

אף הוא נמי דלא קבעי ליה וקתני פטור מפני שהוא נדון בנפשו

so also the owner similarly had no intention to satisfy thereby any need, and yet it is stated THERE WOULD BE NO [CIVIL] LIABILITY AS HE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO A CAPITAL CHARGE?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which would show that setting fire on Sabbath even for purely destructive purposes is a violation of the Sabbath, supporting thus the view of R. Abbahu and contradicting that of R. Johanan. ');">¹</span>

לא שורו דומיא דידיה מה הוא דקבעי ליה אף שורו דקבעי ליה

No; it is the act of Cattle, which is placed on the same level as that of the owner himself, to show that just as in the act of the owner there had surely been the intention to satisfy some need, so also in the act of Cattle there must have been the intention to satisfy some need.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Though with cattle there would really be no legal difference whatsoever whether this was the case or not. ');">²</span>

שורו היכי משכחת לה א"ל רב אויא הכא במאי עסקינן בשור פקח שעלתה לו נשיכה בגבו וקא בעי למקלייה ואיגנדר בקוטמא

But how is this possible in the case of Cattle? — R. Iwiya replied: The case here supposed is one of an intelligent animal which, owing to an itching in the back, was anxious to burn the barn so that it might roll in the [hot] ashes. But how could we know [of such an intention]? [By seeing that] after the barn had been burnt, the animal actually rolled in the ashes. But could such a thing ever happen? — Yes, as in the case of the ox which had been in the house of R. Papa, and which, having a severe toothache, went into the brewery, where it removed the lid [that covered the beer] and drank beer until it became relieved [of the pain]. The Rabbis, however, argued in the presence of R. Papa: How can you say that [the Mishnah places the act of] Cattle on a level with [the act of] the owner himself? For is it not stated: IF CATTLE HAS BROUGHT INDIGNITY [UPON A HUMAN BEING] THERE IS NO LIABILITY,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 192, n. 2. ');">³</span>

ומנא ידעינן דלבתר דקלייה קמגנדר בקוטמא

WHEREAS IF THE OWNER CAUSES THE INDIGNITY THERE IS LIABILITY? Now, if we are to put the act of Cattle on a level with that of the owner himself, how are we to find intention [in the case of Cattle]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Being as it is altogether devoid of the whole conception of insult. ');">⁴</span>

ומי איכא כי האי גוונא אין דההוא תורא דהוה בי רב פפא דהוה כיבין ליה חינכיה עייל ופתקיה לנזייתא ושתי שיכרא ואיתסי

— Where, for instance, there was intention to do damage, as stated by the Master<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Supra p. 141. ');">⁵</span>

אמרו רבנן קמיה דרב פפא מי מצית אמרת שורו דומיא דידיה והא קתני שורו שבייש פטור והוא שבייש חייב שורו דומיא דידיה נתכוון לבייש היכי משכחת לה

that where there was intention to do damage though no intention to insult, [liability for insult will attach]. Raba, however, suggested that the Mishnah here<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which exempts man setting fire on Sabbath from any civil liability involved. ');">⁶</span>

כגון שנתכוון להזיק דאמר מר נתכוון להזיק אע"פ שלא נתכוון לבייש

deals with a case of inadvertence, [resembling thus Cattle which acts as a rule without any specific purpose] and [the law<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Exempting from civil liability in the case of Man. ');">⁷</span>

רבא אמר מתניתין בשוגג

was laid down] in accordance with the teaching at the School of Hezekiah. For it was taught at the School of Hezekiah:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Keth. 35a, 38a; Sanh. 79b and 84b. ');">⁸</span>

וכדתנא דבי חזקיה דתנא דבי חזקיה (ויקרא כד, כא) מכה אדם ומכה בהמה

[Scripture places in juxtaposition] <i>He that killeth a man&nbsp;… and he that killeth a beast</i><span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. XXIV, 21. ');">⁹</span>

מה מכה בהמה לא חלקת בה בין שוגג בין מזיד בין מתכוון לשאין מתכוון בין דרך ירידה לדרך עלייה לפוטרו ממון אלא לחייבו ממון אף מכה אדם לא תחלוק בו בין שוגג למזיד בין מתכוון לשאין מתכוון בין דרך ירידה לדרך עלייה לחייבו ממון אלא לפוטרו ממון

… [to imply that] just as in the case of killing a beast you can make no distinction whether it was inadvertent or malicious, whether intentional or unintentional, whether by way of coming down or by way of coming up,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which, however, forms a distinction in the case of unintentional manslaughter with reference to the liability to take refuge, for which cf. Mak. 7b. ');">¹⁰</span>

אמרו ליה רבנן לרבא מי מצית מוקמת לה בשוגג והא מפני שנדון בנפשו קתני

so as to exempt from pecuniary obligation, but [in all cases] there is pecuniary liability,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As indeed stated supra p. 136. ');">¹¹</span>

הכי קאמר כיון דבמזיד נדון בנפשו והיכי דמי דקא בעי לאפרו השתא בשוגג פטור:

so also in the case of killing man you should make no distinction whether it was inadvertent or malicious, whether intentional or unintentional, whether by way of coming down or by way of coming up so as to impose a pecuniary liability, but [in all cases] there should be exemption from pecuniary obligation.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Even when there is no actual death penalty involved, and likewise in the Mishnah the man setting fire though inadvertently is exempt from all civil liability, so that you cannot infer therefrom that death penalty is attached to setting fire on Sabbath even for destructive purposes. V. supra p. 192. n. 8. ');">¹²</span>

<big><strong>מתני׳</strong></big> שור שהיה רודף אחר שור אחר והוזק זה אומר שורך הזיק וזה אומר לא כי אלא בסלע לקה המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

Said the Rabbis to Raba: How can you assume that the ruling in the Mishnah refers to an inadvertent act?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In which case the capital punishment could never be applied. ');">¹³</span>

היו שנים רודפים אחר אחד זה אומר שורך הזיק וזה אומר שורך הזיק

Is it not stated there [that were the owner to have set fire to a barn on Sabbath there would be no civil liability] AS HE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO A CAPITAL CHARGE?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 192, n. 8. ');">¹⁴</span> — It only means to say this: Since if he would have committed it maliciously he would have been liable to a capital charge, as, e.g., where he had need of the ashes, there should be exemption [from civil liability] even in such a case as this where he did it inadvertently.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' On the basis of the teaching of Hezekiah. ');">¹⁵</span> <b><i>MISHNAH</i></b>. IF AN OX WAS PURSUING AN OTHER'S OX WHICH WAS [AFTERWARDS FOUND TO BE] INJURED, AND THE ONE [PLAINTIFF] SAYS, 'IT WAS YOUR OX THAT DID THE DAMAGE, WHILE THE OTHER PLEADS, 'NOT SO, BUT IT WAS INJURED BY A ROCK [AGAINST WHICH IT HAD BEEN RUBBING ITSELF]',<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Denying thus any liability. ');">¹⁶</span> THE BURDEN OF PROOF LIES ON THE CLAIMANT. [SO ALSO] WHERE TWO [OXEN] PURSUED ONE AND THE ONE DEFENDANT ASSERTS, 'IT WAS YOUR OX THAT DID THE DAMAGE', WHILE THE OTHER DEFENDANT ASSERTS, 'IT WAS YOUR OX THAT DID THE DAMAGE',